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Abstract
When John Turner forwarded his theories on self-help housing, he emphasised 
the concept of dweller control and argued that the state should not be 
involved in housing construction processes. Although there was worldwide 
acknowledgement of his ideas, a large number of self-help programmes 
developed with a fair amount of state-involvement. South Africa’s self-
help programme, called the People’s Housing Process, is no exception 
in this respect. Although designed to ensure larger degrees of ownership 
 by people, evidence of large-scale government influence is clear. This article 
assesses the application of self-help housing in the Free State province and 
argues that a technocratic rather than a people-centred approach (envisaged 
in policy documents) dominated the People’s Housing Process. The levels of 
influence by local people in project design, project implementation and 
housing design remain low, and the housing outcomes do not differ much from 
the normal project subsidy approach.
Keywords: State involvement in housing, self-help housing, people’s housing 
process, housing support centre, support organisation
Abstrak
Toe John Turner sy teorieë oor self-helpbehuising voorgestel het, het hy 
bewonerbeheer as konsep beklemtoon en aan die hand gedoen dat die staat 
nie betrokke behoort te wees by prosesse om behuising op te rig nie. Hoewel 
sy gedagtes wêreldwye erkenning geniet het, het ’n groot hoeveelheid self-
helpprogramme nietemin met ’n redelike mate van staatsbetrokkenheid 
ontwikkel. Suid-Afrika se self-helpprogram, genaamd die Behuisingsproses vir 
die Mense, is in hierdie verband geen uitsondering nie. Hoewel dit ontwerp 
is om ’n groter mate van eienaarskap by mense te verseker, is die getuienis 
van grootskaalse regeringsinvloed duidelik. Hierdie artikel beoordeel die 
toepassing van self-helpbehuising in die Vrystaat provinsie en argumenteer dat 
’n tegnokratiese eerder as mensgesentreerde benadering die Behuisingsproses 
vir die Mense oorheers het. Die mate waartoe plaaslike mense ’n invloed 
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in die projekontwerp, projekimplementering en behuisingontwerp kon 
uitoefen, bly laag en die behuisingsuitkomste verskil nie veel van die normale 
projeksubsidiebenadering nie.
Sleutelwoorde: Staatsbetrokkenheid by behuising, self-helpbehuising, behuisings-
proses, behuisingondersteuningsentrum, ondersteuningsorganisasie
1. Introduction
In the South African context, self-help housing is officially called the 
People’s Housing Process (PHP). The policy on PHP was officially 
adopted in 1998 (South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005). One 
of the key requirements of PHP policy was the establishment of self-
help groups called Housing Support Centres (HSCs), a concept 
similar to the international concept of housing cooperatives. The 
objective of the South African government in implementing PHP 
through Housing Support Centres was to ensure that the housing 
delivery process was both inclusive and community-driven (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2000; South Africa. Department of 
Housing, 2005). Through Housing Support Centres, beneficiaries were 
thus supposed to be involved in the full cycle of any PHP project that 
was undertaken, i.e. from its metaphorical ‘cradle’ to its ‘grave’. 
Essentially, PHP therefore had to ensure increased levels of local 
input in the housing process in comparison with the normal project-
housing processes. This article questions the assumption that PHP 
would give beneficiaries a larger degree of input, and further argues 
that PHP as a form of institutionalised self-help was in fact dominated 
by government, significantly reducing the role of beneficiaries 
in housing. Against the background of this argument, the article 
commences with an overview of self-help housing internationally 
and in South Africa. Thereafter, the focus is on an analysis of the 
case studies and the lessons to be learned from these case studies. 
Essentially our evidence from the implementation of PHP in the Free 
State province suggests that the concerns in the existing literature 
about state control as opposed to people-driven approaches are 
legitimate.
Methodologically, the article draws on a qualitative research 
approach in the process of which one focus group (comprising an 
average of 10 to 13 participants) in each of the five chosen projects 
was conducted. Participants were beneficiaries of PHP subsidies 
with completed houses. In-depth interviews were also conducted 
with all the local project managers and trustees in these five projects 
while one in-depth interview was conducted with a senior provincial 
administrator of PHP in the Free State province. In this context project 
managers would usually be any community member, preferably 
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someone with outstanding and sound background in construction 
industry, while trustees would usually be community members who 
are also beneficiaries of PHP project. The five chosen projects 
included Ikgwantlelleng Housing Support Centre in Bultfontein, 
Kgotsong Housing Support Centre in Bothaville, Kutlwanong Housing 
Support Centre in Odendaalsrus, Iketsetseng Housing Support Centre 
in Virginia, and Retshepeng Housing Support Centre in Parys. For the 
five chosen projects, there were five project managers and seven 
trustees (with Kgotsong and Retshepeng Housing Support Centres 
comprising two instead of one trustee) who were interviewed. 
While permission to disclose names of the participants in any of 
my reports is being granted by project managers, trustees and 
provincial PHP administrator through a signed consent letter, the 
agreement with beneficiaries was to use their focus group numbers 
for confidentiality. 
2. Background to self-help
Before the case studies can be assessed, background knowledge 
of self-help housing is essential. To this end, a brief review of both the 
international history and the national background are provided.
2.1 International perspective
Two factors contributed to the rise of self-help. First, it should be 
noted that self-help housing is as old as humankind (Pugh, 2001; 
Harris, 1999b; Harris, 2003). In fact, self-help was conventional 
wisdom long before the ‘emergence’ of the concept in the late 
1960s – and long before Turner formulated his ideas in this regard 
(Harms, 1992; Ward, 1982; Parnell & Hart, 1999). Harris (1998: 185) 
and Harris (2003: 257) cites the examples of Puerto Rico and India 
in the late 1930s and 1940s to illustrate the fact that self-help was 
practised and supported by governments before the Second World 
War. Secondly, the emphasis on aided self-help cannot be analysed 
in isolation from the drive for public-sector housing delivery since the 
Second World War. In an attempt to reconstruct the post-war urban 
fabric, government involvement in housing became conventional 
wisdom. Nevertheless, the international literature suggests that very 
few countries have managed to address their housing shortages by 
means of the public-sector provision and management of housing 
(Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1997).
Against the backdrop of the failure of government-driven 
approaches to housing delivery, Turner’s work in Latin America 
became widely known (cf. Turner, 1976). As pointed out earlier, 
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Harris (1998), Harris (1999a) and Harris (2003) indicated that Turner 
(an architect by profession) was certainly not the first person to 
promote self-help. At the same time, it should be acknowledged 
that Turner is probably the most frequently cited author on self-help 
(Harris, 2003). Turner based his work on a number of principles in 
respect of housing (Turner, 1976). First, he viewed housing as a ‘verb’. 
In this way, he emphasised that housing should be regarded as a 
process; and the other consideration should be, housing evolves 
over time, with due consideration of the income of the household, 
the life cycle of the inhabitants and the needs of those who occupy 
the house. Secondly, he also argued that a house should not be 
considered in terms of its physical characteristics alone. In his view, 
the importance of housing lay not in ‘what it is’, but in ‘what it 
does’ (its functionality). The fact that housing is upgraded over time 
ensures that the physical characteristics of the house are likely to 
improve, in cases, that is, where people are given the ‘freedom to 
build’, rather than being provided with a completed housing unit 
without any choice. Thirdly, the value of the house to the user is 
related to dweller control, rather than to its physical characteristics. 
In this regard, Turner (1976) argued that the main criterion in respect 
of housing pertained to the question as to whether the owner was 
in control of the construction process, or in the decision in respect of 
the planning or purchasing of the house. (The latter refers to the way 
in which middle- and higher income people ensure dweller control: 
we buy what we like, within our budget and at a location that suits 
us). Harris (2003: 248) summarises Turner’s contribution as follows:
By self-help Turner has always meant not only the investment of 
sweat equity by owners in their homes but also the processes 
of owner-design and management.  
Harris (2003) also points out the irony of the fact that, although dweller 
control was probably the most novel idea that Turner brought to 
the housing debate, it is also the very idea that has received the 
least recognition in the policy development domain. This point is 
key to the argument regarding housing policy in South Africa as put 
forward in this article.
In practice, Turner’s ideas were operationalised in two ways. 
The first was through aided self-help (site and services) and the 
second through what is termed institutionalised self-help (mainly 
through housing cooperatives). Although aided self-help was 
commonly associated with neo-liberal trends in Political Economy, 
institutionalised self-help was practised in capitalist and socialist 
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countries (for example, Cuba). Institutionalised self-help thus 
became a way in which government could intervene in the housing 
process – something Turner did not propose.
2.2 South African perspective
The National Policy for Supporting PHP as a housing-delivery 
mechanism was approved and implemented in 1998 (South Africa. 
Department of Housing, 2005). However, Huchzermeyer (2001) and 
Napier (2003) argued that it is not clear whether the justification 
for implementing PHP is to be found in the international donor’s 
pressure or in internal pressure from community-based organisations 
such as the Homeless People’s Federation. The development of 
policy was further supported by the establishment of the People’s 
Housing Partnership Trust in 1998. From self-help point of view, with 
its inception in 1998, the aim of PHP policy was to shift a focus of 
housing delivery in South African context from that of state-driven 
(top-down) approach to a more people-driven approach (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2000; South Africa. Department of 
Housing, 2005). It is argued in the literature (see, for example, South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2005; Ntema, 2009) that in order to 
achieve an inclusive and community-driven housing delivery, the 
policy advocates a number of concepts which could to a certain 
extent be tied up with initial principles of self-help housing as 
advanced by Turner (see, for example, Turner, 1976). For example, 
from self-help point of view the following concepts as entrenched 
in the PHP policy guidelines should be considered ‘sweat equity’, 
‘people-driven housing process’, ‘community empowerment’, 
‘partnerships in housing delivery’, ‘transfer of skills’ through housing, 
‘greater choice’ by beneficiaries in how they want to use their 
subsidies, ‘direct involvement’ of beneficiaries in the entire housing 
process, use of ‘recycled material’, ‘increased beneficiary input’, 
‘Housing Support Centres’, ‘positive housing outcomes’, and 
‘adequate housing’ (South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005; 
South Africa. Department of Housing, 2000; Baumann, 2003; LGH 
Newsletter, 2006). Overall, the PHP programme can be considered 
an institutional self-help response. Yet, contrary to the primary goal 
of the PHP policy, the implementation of this programme (PHP) 
through self-help groups called Housing Support Centres, we wish 
to argue, has been structured in such a way that (as we do indeed 
argue in this article) it ensures state control – this despite the fact 
that PHP was justified through neo-liberal arguments such as sweat 
equity and acquiring a bigger house for the same amount (see 
Thurman, 1999; Khan & Pieterse, 2004; BRCS, 2003).  
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The existing literature portrays at least several contentious issues in 
relation to PHP. First, literature suggests PHP as a housing delivery 
mechanism as opposed to an organic social process (People’s 
Dialogue on Land and Shelter, 1999). In this respect Thurman 
(1999) argues that many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
(appointed as Support Organisations occupying these Housing 
Support Centres) were concerned about the bureaucratic regulatory 
framework that left limited space for innovation and for community 
or individual response. At the same time, there also seems to be 
evidence that government purposefully selected NGOs to become 
Support Organisations (Manie, 2004). Another consequence in this 
respect is that the emphasis is on delivery and not the process. In 
this respect Khan & Pieterse (2004: 19) argue that a government 
in pursuit of delivery objectives tends to violate PHP principles in 
limiting beneficiary choice to unpaid labour (sweat equity). The 
Urban Sector Network and Development Works (2003) argues that 
this is specifically done to ensure state control as PHP facilitated by 
communities was considered uncontrollable.
Secondly, there seems to be evidence in existing South African 
literature (both peer-reviewed journals and policy documents) 
that the state dominated the norms and standards in this housing 
approach – similar to the case for contractor-driven housing 
approaches (Baumann, 2003). This is reflected in the policy 
document on PHP (South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005: 35) 
which states that: 
when designing the house, attention by the builders and 
Housing Support Centres must be given to National Minimum 
Norms and Standards in respect of Permanent Residential 
Structures as prescribed. 
This notion is further supported in policy documents which (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2005: 11) states that “Support 
Organisations would advise beneficiaries about the minimum 
norms and standards applicable” (South Africa. Department of 
Housing, 2005: 11). To enforce the prescribed norms and standards 
(South Africa. Department of Housing, 2000), the guidelines on 
Housing Support Centre stress the ability of these organisations 
to comply with technical requirements and that they should 
satisfy the relevant authorities in terms of capacity. The important 
conclusion from this is that one of the main reasons for the 
establishment of Housing Support Centres relates to the fact that 
houses should be technically ‘sound’ as decided by government 
and not as decided (or controlled) by dwellers. Baumann (2003) 
argues that despite the fact that the PHP process was exempted 
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from registering with the Home Builders Registration Council, 
other norms and standards did apply (albeit more prominently 
in some provinces than in others). Baumann (2003: 10) also aptly 
summarises this emphasis on state control in the following words:
Relationships have not changed: the state defines and retains 
control over the process, and the interface between it and 
beneficiaries continues to be a layer of state-approved, 
formal institutions. 
In the process, the state has thus compromised and reduced, among 
others, the economic autonomy of these institutions (in particular, 
Housing Support Centres) in two ways. An emphasis by the state 
on minimum norms and standards seems, despite being in direct 
conflict with the principles of ‘dweller control’ and ‘freedom to build’ 
(as advocated by Turner), to further reinforce the neo-Marxist idea 
of housing as a product of ‘bureaucratically and technologically 
top-down heavy system’ approach (Ward, 1982).
Thirdly, it does not seem as if the concept of dweller control is 
used in any significant manner in the PHP policy, or in practice. 
In fact, the concepts of self-construction and ‘sweat equity’, 
quality housing and larger housing units are commonly cited to 
express the motivation for PHP. For example, the Housing Code 
 motivates the PHP approach as follows: 
Experience has proved that if beneficiaries are given the 
chance either to build houses themselves or to organise the 
building of houses themselves, they can build better houses 
for less money (South Africa. Department of Housing, 2000).
Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, the Minister of Housing in 1998, stated:
Self-building through the PHP [has] proved to be one of the 
most effective strategies in producing quality housing. Most of 
the … houses built through this process were of better quality 
and bigger than those delivered through pure subsidy grants 
(Gauteng News, 2001). 
It appears that the intention in respect of the PHP lies mainly in self-
construction, or the expectation of receiving something better, 
larger or cheaper (more cost-effective) – in comparison to the 
product received by means of the contractor-driven approach. The 
silence on dweller control – in a programme in which it should have 
been prominent – is deafening.  
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Fourthly, there appears to be some confusion in respect of the 
ideological underpinnings of the motivation for the PHP process. 
In this regard, neoliberal ideas relating to sweat equity and self-
construction in order to transfer costs from the state to individuals 
are used in the same breath as the arguments that are typically 
put forward by neo-Marxists, who emphasise aspects such as quality 
housing and bigger housing.
Existing literature in peer-reviewed journals also suggests that PHP 
processes have seldom led to larger community development 
processes. The overemphasis on technical aspects, norms and 
standards and control made PHP a housing process rather than a 
community development process (Sangonet, 2010).
Contrary to the principles of self-help as advanced by Turner and 
entrenched in PHP policy document (Turner, 1976; South Africa. 
Department of Housing, 2005), such emphasis on government 
control rather than dweller control usually eliminates any possibility 
for practice of neither ‘increased input’ nor ‘greater choice’ by 
beneficiaries in how they would want to use their subsidies.
3. Project initiation and project management: Is there a 
place for dweller control?
Before the assessment of PHP project management is made, the 
figure showing the institutional structure of this mechanism is required 
(see Figure 1). The figure intends to demonstrate how in practice 
the entire PHP process usually unfolds once a group of qualifying 
beneficiaries is being identified locally. It should be noted that the 
community structures are located in the centre, with government 
and other support organisations on the periphery.
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groups. First, in all the five visited projects, beneficiaries mentioned 
that project managers and trustees simply turned up one day 
and told them they were going to be helped with applications for 
subsidies for PHP housing. A beneficiary who was interviewed in one 
of the focus groups confirmed this: 
We found Mr Maduna and his colleagues already working 
on another project which was nearing its completion…after 
that project they grouped us and told us that they were 
going to help us build Masakhane houses (Focus Group 2, 
10/09/2008).  
Expressing a similar sentiment, although being from another project, 
one beneficiary said: 
We just heard that Mr Biko was building houses…with time, 
he came to us to inform us about his projects and requested 
that we submit our names for his list of applicants for the 
Masakhane subsidies (Focus Group 5, 28/10/2008).  
Secondly, the dominance of the Provincial Housing Department is 
reflected in the fact that beneficiaries from all the five projects did 
not know who had appointed both the project managers and the 
trustees. The following quotation confirms this conclusion: 
Messrs Chaka and Mangosha came to us at one of the 
community meetings already appointed and told us about 
their work…not sure who appointed them (Focus Group 3, 
11/09/2008).  
Thirdly, the dominance of the Provincial Housing Department is also 
obvious in that beneficiaries’ contributions during the initiation process 
were, in the five cases, limited to only the personal completion of 
the housing application forms. One focus group member gave the 
following response: 
We just saw Mum Winnie and her colleague helping us with 
filling in forms and later with construction…not sure who 
appointed them (Focus Group 4, 12/09/2008). 
Other than the above statements by the beneficiaries, further 
confirming the state dominance in the appointment of project 
managers and trustees in the Free State Province, are some of the 
remarks made by the project managers and trustees during the 
interviews. One project manager stated:
We called the Provincial Office to enquire about the possibility 
of starting a PHP project, they then send someone to come 
and advise us…he then urged us to group ourselves and find 
50 people to be our beneficiaries – that is how we started 
(Ngonelo, 2008: personal communication). 
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Expressing similar sentiments two other project managers said: 
I started working under Thusanong Supporting Centre and later 
due to the influence and advice by the officials from Provincial 
Housing Department, I started my own Trust called Kgotsong 
HSC in 2000 (Maduna, 2008: personal communication).
Having worked under Dr Van Niekerk, I then begun interaction 
with some officials from Bloemfontein…they advised me 
on how to become independent and mobilise qualifying 
homeless people. I followed their advice then applied for 
allocation from the Provincial Housing Department…a year 
later I was called and told that we qualified for 100 units (Biko, 
2008b: personal communication). 
The implication of the above evidence is that the Support 
Organisations (comprising project managers and trustees) were 
approved by the state long before they could even mobilise the 
communities to buy into the idea of a self-help mechanism. Instead 
of beneficiaries identifying their preferred Support Organisations, the 
Support Organisations were found to be the ones identifying and 
approaching the qualifying homeless members of their communities. 
While policy guidelines stipulate that an initiative should be taken 
by the beneficiaries to identify and recommend the Support 
Organisation of their choice to the state for approval and not the 
other way round, the above evidence confirmed to a large extent 
the argument of state-control.   
3.2  Project management and the role of Housing Support 
Centres  
Similar to the international concept of housing co-operatives, 
the South African government has adopted self-help institutions 
called Housing Support Centres. The literature (see, for example, 
Turner, 1976), also indicates that one of the key tasks of housing 
co-operatives is to promote what Turner called ‘autonomous’ 
people-driven housing delivery through the self-help mechanism. 
Following the state’s interference with the autonomy of both 
housing co-operatives and Housing Support Centres, respectively 
(Ntema, 2009), these self-help institutions never-in-practice became 
autonomous. As part of project planning and initiation, the policy 
guidelines require the Housing Support Centres to take responsibility 
for organising the six compulsory mandatory workshops for the 
beneficiaries and advise them in their initiative to identify and 
appoint their preferred construction teams or bricklayers (see also 
South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005). Contrary to both the 
above policy requirements and the self-help principles, this section 
raises two main arguments. 
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First, Housing Support Centres failed to involve the beneficiaries in 
the appointment of the construction teams. The policy guidelines 
on PHP stipulate that the “Housing Support Centres only advise 
beneficiaries on whom to appoint for construction in terms of the 
required skills and capability as determined by the Provincial Housing 
Department” (see also South Africa. Department of Housing, 2005). 
The failure of the Housing Support Centres to allow the beneficiaries 
to exercise their right to appoint their preferred construction teams 
are evident in a number of examples. Beneficiaries in all the five 
focus groups suggested that the first time they saw their bricklayers 
was on the day they arrived, carrying their equipment and ready to 
commence construction without them (beneficiaries) knowing how 
they (bricklayers) had been appointed. One person in one of the 
focus groups confirmed this:
Mr Maduna brought his own builders and urged us to help 
them with mixing mortar and bringing bricks closer and 
cleaning walls (Focus Group 2, 10/09/2008).  
Other beneficiaries from other projects also indicated that, 
despite their consistent enquiry concerning their role in appointing 
bricklayers, project managers and trustees insisted that their main 
concern should be when to occupy their completed houses and 
that they should trust them to appoint competent bricklayers: 
Our houses were built by builders appointed by the Support 
Organisation…Mum Winnie told us that it would be their 
responsibility to appoint builders; we should not make that our 
problem (Focus Group 4, 12/09/2008).  
Some of the beneficiaries also claimed that project managers 
had undermined the competency of the bricklayers they (the 
beneficiaries) had recommended to them and never endorsed 
them:
Initially, ‘Thumbo’ urged us to bring our own builders; later on 
he changed his mind and told us that they would bring their 
own builders, forcing us to abandon our preferred builders…I 
refused and was called names (Focus Group 3, 11/09/2008).  
In what could be considered an endorsement of their failure to 
involve beneficiaries in appointing construction teams, all the project 
managers and trustees interviewed suggested no wrongdoing 
in their conduct. One trustee suggested that beneficiaries were 
generally only capable of and competent in helping bricklayers 
with actual construction and not with the process of identifying the 
right people for the work. 
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As management we look for skilled bricklayers who then get 
help from beneficiaries…beneficiaries help them with mixing 
mortar, bringing bricks closer during construction (Makafane, 
2008).  
Expressing similar sentiment another trustee indicated that 
beneficiaries could not be given responsibility for taking major 
decisions such as who was to build, but should be entrusted with less 
important responsibilities.  
As a trust, we appoint builders and ask beneficiaries to help 
them with other minor tasks (Makafane, 2008: personal 
communication). 
Thus, there appears to have been conflict between who the project 
managers regarded to be skilled bricklayers and what beneficiaries’ 
opinions were in this respect. Managers justified their decisions on 
technical ability, while communities based theirs on trust. The obvious 
end result is one where contractors will be blamed if there are any 
defaults. Therefore, on a psychological level, this has not helped to 
support dweller control. 
There is evidence from three of the five focus group discussions 
that the project managers and trustees took advantage of the 
beneficiaries’ lack of knowledge of their own roles and rights in a 
PHP mechanism and used this to convey the wrong information and 
impose unilateral decisions on them. Although the beneficiaries in 
all of the five Housing Support Centres visited seemed to know the 
total amount of their individual capital subsidies (R42 000.00), they 
nevertheless allowed their respective Housing Support Centres to 
dictate not only how the material was to be used, but also how to 
distribute and use the surplus material. Beneficiaries in Kutlwanong 
(Odendaalsrus), Tumahole (Parys) and Meloding (Virginia) claimed 
that they were told (by their respective Housing Support Centres) 
that building material was for the entire project and not for 
individual households. This implied that the Housing Support Centres 
were entitled to retrieve all the surplus materials from the individual 
households with completed housing and could either use such 
surplus for other beneficiaries or even in another, new project. As a 
result, there was no means whereby beneficiaries could relate the 
quantity of material used on their houses to their total subsidy of R42 
000. 00. In one incident, some of the beneficiaries suggested that 
they had never been part of the process of project breakdown and 
costing; something that rendered them powerless to question even 
quite obvious questionable acts by the project managers. Said one 
of the beneficiaries: 
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We don’t know and were never told as to out of our R42 000 
subsidy; how much our material actually cost and how much 
was left if any…because at one stage we were asked to pay 
people who were hired to dig foundations, out of our own 
pockets (Focus Group 2, 10/09/2008).  
Another beneficiary implied that one had to risk being called names 
by the project managers for being stubborn, in order to get what 
was rightfully theirs. He also confirmed that:
[i]nitially they (Housing Support Centre) told us that all the 
surplus material would be ours, but later they changed and 
said every bit of surplus material belongs to the Housing 
Support Centre…although they build my house with material 
they took from other people, I refused to give them surplus 
bricks (Focus Group 3, 11/09/2008).
Attesting further to the unfair treatment of beneficiaries by their 
project managers, one of the beneficiaries mentioned that they:
were strictly instructed that when there is material left after 
construction, only Mr Biko would come and collect it…
initially, some people wanted to argue they were entitled to 
the surplus material, but ultimately that was resolved (Focus 
Group 5, 28/10/2008). 
Although the above situation could, on the one hand, be attributed 
to a general lack of knowledge among the beneficiaries, the 
situation could, on the other, be attributed to the the fact that the 
majority of the beneficiaries seemed to believe that questioning such 
issues, while it was guaranteed that they would receive complete 
houses, would make them appear less grateful. They were also of 
the opinion that qualifying for a PHP house was more a privilege 
than a constitutional right; thus, being less grateful could result in 
government withdrawing such a privilege or favour at any time. 
Such observations raised further doubts about the effectiveness or 
impact of consumer education that both the provincial and local 
project officials claimed to have organised for these beneficiaries 
prior to project implementation.
3.3  Project management and the role of Support Empower 
Bridge Reconstruction Account (SEBRA)
In 2006 the Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing 
appointed SEBRA to become its financial agency (Ndlovu, 2008). In 
terms of its operation, SEBRA executes its functions directly from the 
Provincial Housing Department offices in Bloemfontein. Following, in 
particular, experienced delays in project completion, purchasing 
materials, lack of financial accountability and poor management 
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by the majority of the Housing Support Centres in the province 
(Ndlovu, 2008; Ntema & Hoosen, 2008), in 2006 the Provincial Housing 
Department decided to appoint and task SEBRA with control and 
responsibility for procurement process. It is important first to note 
that central to SEBRA’s responsibilities was the duty to ensure that 
government’s initial mandate on housing people through the PHP 
mechanism would be fulfilled timeously and with no deviation from 
government’s plans and programmes. Evidence given by the five 
project managers and by a senior PHP administrator proves that, since 
SEBRA’s appointment, there has been a significant improvement in 
the standard of project management and administration by the 
Housing Support Centres in the province as compared to the period 
prior to 2006. There are two key issues that could be attributed to 
the improved and efficient project management by the Housing 
Support Centres. First, the introduction of skills development 
programmes by SEBRA for project managers and trustees and, 
secondly, effective and efficient project monitoring and control by 
SEBRA. There is evidence that, since the appointment of SEBRA and 
the reduction of Housing Support Centres to only 14, there has been 
an improved rate of projects successfully completed long before 
the set deadlines. In this context successful completion of projects 
would refer to a situation where projects are being completed within 
the set time lines, without the initial allocated project funds being 
either overspent or underspent. For example, in Parys, the project 
manager claimed that it took them less than six months to complete 
100 units (Biko, 2008b: personal communication). This is a slightly 
shorter period compared to the lengthy period they would have 
taken to complete the same number of units prior to the introduction 
of SEBRA in 2006. 
However, the appointment of SEBRA was not (from a self-help 
perspective) without some criticism. The appointment of SEBRA 
could be considered a deliberate strategy by the Provincial Housing 
Department to effect its control of PHP activities. While the Provincial 
Housing Department imposed, through their appointed Housing 
Support Centres, their own house plans, SEBRA was instrumental in 
marginalising both the beneficiaries and the Housing Support Centres 
from participating in the choice of building materials. Confirming 
this, project managers and trustees suggested that they were always 
being made to feel that nothing (either in material or ideas) of value 
or quality was likely to come from themselves as local officials or their 
local communities. One of the trustees confirmed this: 
We would usually submit our quotations from our locally 
preferred emerging suppliers to SEBRA for consideration and 
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possible approval…always to our disappointment, SEBRA 
would choose their own ‘well established’ supplier for all 
the Housing Support Centres in the province; none of our 
recommended suppliers would be considered (Chaka, 2008: 
personal communication). 
Expressing similar sentiment, one project manager implied that, 
despite SEBRA having invested so much in funded programmes for 
their own skills development, they were still not being trusted to take 
sole responsibility for some of the basics in project management in 
which they had received training. He mentioned that:
[p]ersonally I think, as part of empowerment, Housing Support 
Centres should be allowed to run and manage their funds 
and procurement of their material directly from their preferred 
local suppliers than to depend on SEBRA (Ngonelo, 2008: 
personal communication).  
With SEBRA taking sole responsibility for appointing material suppliers 
and making the final choice as to the type of material to be used, 
without any input by either the beneficiaries or the Housing Support 
Centres, could be regarded as a deliberate strategy by government 
to impose its unilateral decisions on both the beneficiaries and the 
Housing Support Centres. It could also be argued that central to the 
marginalisation of Housing Support Centres and beneficiaries in the 
key decision-making processes may be the government’s attempt 
(through SEBRA) to ensure speedy housing delivery ‘using quality 
materials’ as supplied by suppliers perceived to be in good standing. 
SEBRA may also be perceived to be a state tool to eliminate the 
practice of what Turner called the use of locally produced resources 
or materials by appointing its own preferred external material 
supplier for all the provincial Housing Support Centres. The added 
disadvantage of using SEBRA in choosing materials and suppliers 
could be that it runs contrary to the self-help spirit of encouraging 
use of local resources as well as ‘diversity’ in resources mobilised 
by the dwellers when building their houses. For example, in all of 
the five sites visited, Housing Support Centres used similar wooden 
doors and bricks supplied by one central supplier. The appointment 
of SEBRA, in turn, which was known for its marginalisation of Housing 
Support Centres when negotiating deals with suppliers, and for its 
constant neglect of emerging local suppliers who had worked with 
Housing Support Centres prior to its (SEBRA’s) appointment in 2006 
(Chaka, 2008: personal communication; Makafane, 2008: personal 
communication), may be viewed as contrary to the spirit both of 
local economic development and of community empowerment 
(Ntema & Hoosen, 2008). 
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3.4 Housing design and planning 
The preceding sections have made it abundantly clear that in 
terms of overall project management, beneficiaries were mostly 
excluded. According to the PHP Policy Guidelines, the role of the 
beneficiaries is twofold: first, at the level of the key decision-making 
process during the project planning and initiation, through their 
elected Housing Support Committee (HSCom) and, secondly, at the 
level of the actual construction, through their sweat equity (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2000). However, despite Turner’s 
view that sweat equity or self-construction should not be equated 
to dweller control, the available literature on PHP has indicated that 
the role of beneficiaries is being severely reduced and limited so as 
to encompass only sweat equity (see, for example, Khan & Pieterse, 
2004). The evidence from our case studies confirms this trend to 
a large extent. Nevertheless, one of the emphases of the policy 
guidelines is the recognition and upholding (by all the role players) 
of some of the key principles of PHP, such as ‘greater choice’ and 
‘increased input’ by the beneficiaries in using their subsidies (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2005). 
The failure of the Housing Support Centres and the Provincial 
Housing Department to allow the beneficiaries to exercise their 
right to participate and to influence the initial process of house 
design and planning has manifested itself in two visible ways. First, 
beneficiaries were seldom part of any decision-making process 
when house plans and designs were discussed and finalised. 
Secondly, some of the beneficiaries, members of the Housing 
Support Committee, suggested that their appointment was mainly 
to satisfy the requirements of the policy and not those of the actual 
implementation process. They were of the opinion that they were 
being used by the Provincial Housing Department and Housing 
Support Centres as window dressing. One of the chairpersons said 
the following at one of the focus group meetings: 
They said we must elect a committee but I can’t remember 
when we last had a meeting with them (Support Organisation). 
Until the project was complete…we were never part of their 
decisions; we were treated like all other ordinary beneficiaries 
(Focus Group 3, 11/09/2008).  
Another chairperson suggested that at times (as committee 
members) they were taken by surprise by some major developments 
as these unfolded during the construction process and by the ability 
of the project managers to always withhold information and sideline 
them.  
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We did not even know that our houses (plans) were going 
to have a front veranda; we only for the first time saw it as it 
happened (Focus Group 5, 28/10/2008).  
Other than the committee members, ordinary beneficiaries in all the 
five projects visited also suggested that they had been completely 
sidelined from influencing the key decision processes on design and 
planning. Beneficiaries indicated that their role had been reduced 
to one of ensuring the safety and supervision of the use of their 
materials during construction. One of the beneficiaries confirmed 
this:
We would sign for the incoming and outgoing material such as 
cement…always ensured that material issued to the builders 
was used accordingly (Focus Group 5, 28/10/2008).  
Other than that, they were expected to contribute their sweat 
equity.  
We would help with mixing the mortar, jointing and bringing 
bricks closer for the builders (Focus Group 1, 09/09/2008). 
Confirming the exclusion of the beneficiaries from participating in 
the project initiation processes, some of the project managers and 
trustees implied that their illegitimate practice resulted from either 
ignorance or from a deliberate effort to undermine the policy 
guidelines. One of the trustees confirmed this when he quoted the 
policy out of context:
We appoint builders and ask beneficiaries as the policy 
requires to assist them with other minor construction tasks 
(Mokone, 2008: personal communication). 
Secondly, marginalisation of beneficiaries from participating in 
the planning stages of the project manifested itself in the lack of 
diversity in the design and planning of houses built through the 
PHP mechanism in the province. From a self-help perspective, an 
obvious assumption, in the context of a policy in which dweller-
control is central, would be that it is reasonable to expect housing 
design and planning to be of a diverse nature, since dweller-control 
is likely to result in ‘different’ people building ‘in different ways.’ 
Despite this (as alleged by the beneficiaries during the focus-
group discussions), government appointed state agencies (e.g. 
SEBRA) and its own preferred Housing Support Centres to impose its 
decision on beneficiaries to construct houses of its own choice using 
builders and material that were unilaterally chosen by, respectively, 
the Housing Support Centres and SEBRA. Some of the beneficiaries 
suggested that the PHP denied them the opportunity of using their 
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own housing designs and plans to express their own personal needs 
and preferences. One of the beneficiaries articulated this problem 
during the focus group meetings:
Our houses look the same because of the plan given to us…
none of us beneficiaries could change it…I wanted to have 
my door next to the toilet but they refused (Focus Group 3, 
11/09/2008).  
Further confirming the lack of diversity in the house design and 
planning resulting from non-participation by the beneficiaries, 
some of the project managers and trustees suggested that nobody 
seemed to have the courage to question the authority of politicians, 
even if it meant carrying out illegitimate activities. One of the trustees 
confirmed that their houses looked alike
because of the instruction from the MEC to apply without 
changing their original plan…the MEC gave us a plan that 
included the structure for the inside toilet (Chaka, 2008: 
personal communication).  
Expressing a similar sentiment, another trustee mentioned that
Our houses look the same because of the plan from 
government…neither we nor the beneficiaries could 
deviate from that binding plan (Biko, 2008a: personal 
communication). 
4. Conclusion
This article has argued that institutionalised self-help provides 
government with a platform to intervene and dominate housing 
processes. It does not assist beneficiaries to control the processes 
of planning, design and construction of housing. This is the case 
both internationally and in South Africa. The case studies used in 
this article have confirmed this. The irony of such state dominance is 
that state dominance did not necessarily lead to effective project 
management and that the assistance of a private firm had to be 
procured. Although, admittedly, there is a convincing argument for 
technical soundness and effective financial management, our case 
studies suggest the following main conclusions: 
Although central to PHP policy guidelines, there are concepts • 
such as ‘greater choice’ and ‘beneficiary input’ (referred to 
by Turner as dweller control), these concepts were, in practice, 
never experienced by the beneficiaries either during project 
initiation and housing design or during project management, 
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as a result of the state’s interference with the PHP programmes 
and its deliberate deviation from the general principles of 
self-help. 
The Free State Provincial Government still dictates directly or • 
indirectly through SEBRA (top-down approach) the process 
and imposes its decision in terms of the type of housing 
(design and planning) to be built, material suppliers, and who 
(Housing Support Centres) will be appointed to manage the 
project.
The obvious question is whether a project left to be implemented 
by the communities according to the guidelines would have been 
more ‘successful’. In the main, this article emphasises that what is 
needed are government officials who are facilitators rather than 
dominant role players, and that a fine balance needs to be restored 
between technically sound housing development and housing 
development that takes into account both dweller control and the 
policy guidelines. Worth noting is the fact that while this study and 
its findings are grounded in the pool of existing literature, its main 
argument is based on empirical findings derived from people’s 
practical experiences of application and practice of self-help 
on the ground. Thus, a more case study-based primary evidence 
is being generated and it could further be used to critique and 
possibly influence future processes of policy review, practice and 
re-alignment.  
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